Whilst being operated in a manual flight mode, the unmanned aircraft breached the geofence and changed to an automated flight mode. In response, the remote pilot reduced the throttle and changed back to the manual mode. Control of the aircraft was lost because the mode was changed at a low throttle setting and the subsequent actions to regain control were unsuccessful. The aircraft struck the ground and was destroyed.
The operator no longer uses the manual mode and has promoted the use of standardised phraseology between the ground control station operator and the remote pilot. Further action has been taken to consider and apply a suitably sized geofence for each operational flight.
The Operation Safety Case on which the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) granted a Specific Category Operational Authorisation were missing definitions and procedures for the use of geofences and actions to be taken in the event of a breach. A Safety Recommendation has been made to the CAA as these omissions have further effect as the use of a geofence is widely used as a mitigation for several other operational risks.