Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States to respond to comments made regarding Australia's acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability through the AUKUS partnership. We are again compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that purposefully mischaracterise AUKUS partners' intentions and attempt to undermine the independence, integrity, and authority of the IAEA. Under this item, the Board has repeatedly heard unsubstantiated claims that ignore or misrepresent the information we have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General.
I reiterate that this matter has not been adopted as a standing agenda item by this Board and has never enjoyed consensus support. It is regrettable that this unnecessary item has been added to the agenda for nearly three years, at the insistence of one member state, when there are pressing non-proliferation concerns requiring the Board's attention.
Director General Grossi has expressed his satisfaction with AUKUS partners' engagement and transparency and reiterated that he will continue to update the Board on naval nuclear propulsion as appropriate. The AUKUS partners have continued to engage consistently, openly, and transparently with Member States and the Secretariat on genuine questions, including at the 2023 and 2024 NPT Preparatory Committees. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have provided updates on relevant progress at all Board meetings since the initial AUKUS announcement in September 2021. We will do so again at this meeting under Any Other Business, where it remains most appropriate.
Chair,
The Director General has already provided clear answers to questions raised today and in previous meetings, including in his reports on Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program to the Board:
Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Article 14 of the IAEA's draft Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is the specific provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity, including for naval nuclear propulsion, within the safeguards framework.
The IAEA has the clear authority, under the IAEA Statute, as agreed by 178 Member States, to negotiate directly with Member States on the establishment, and application, of safeguards and verification arrangements - including those pertaining to naval nuclear propulsion. The NPT, IAEA Statute, Australia's CSA, and Additional Protocol provide a firm legal basis for Australia to engage with the IAEA on the safeguards and verification approach for this program.
The Director General has clearly stated that the Agency has "the necessary experience to develop the arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements." Despite these statements, it is concerning that some states persistently question the Director General's ability to perform the functions vested in him by the Statute, by the relevant safeguards agreements, and by decisions of the Board.
It is untrue that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a nuclear-weapon State to a non-nuclear-weapon State runs counter to the spirit of the NPT. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level to a non-nuclear-weapon State, is not prohibited by the NPT and indeed such transfers have regularly taken place with IAEA oversight.
Under the Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material. Australia's Article 14 arrangement will include a package of robust verification measures that will enable the IAEA to continue to meet its technical safeguards objectives throughout the submarines' lifecycle. Once the Article 14 arrangement is developed, the Director General will transmit it to the Board for 'appropriate action' - as we have said many times before. To suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed is categorically false.
We would also like to draw the Board's attention to the recent signing and publication of the AUKUS Agreement for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Provision. Upon entry into force, this Agreement will reaffirm Australia's obligations under the NPT and make Australia's other key non-proliferation commitments legally binding conditions for AUKUS partners' ongoing cooperation. Importantly, under the Agreement, Australia cannot receive any nuclear material from the UK or the US for use in naval nuclear propulsion prior to having an Article 14 Agreement in place.
Chair,
Our three countries - along with the majority of this Board - continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item or to establish any efforts that undermine and politicise the independent technical mandate of the IAEA. We encourage colleagues to continue to reject deliberate efforts to undermine the Agency's independence and integrity.
We will continue to engage in good faith with Member States on genuine questions, consistent with our approach to maintaining open and transparent engagement, and welcome the Director General's continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as he deems appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.
