Biden-Harris Tackles Gun Threats, Enhances School Drills

The White House

Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security Release New Resources to Help Schools Improve Active Shooter Drills

Emerging Firearm Threats Task Force Sends President Biden Report on Machinegun Conversion Devices and 3D Printed Firearms

The Biden-Harris Administration has overseen the two largest single-year decreases in homicide ever recorded. Violence in many cities is at pre-pandemic levels. The Administration helped contribute to these historic decreases through unprecedented public safety funding for states, cities, law enforcement, and community violence interventions; more executive action on gun violence prevention than any other Administration; passing and implementing the first significant gun safety law in nearly 30 years; and the establishment of the first-ever White House Office of Gun Violence Prevention (OGVP) to coordinate and lead the Administration's effort to reduce gun crime and other forms of gun violence.

Today, the Biden-Harris Administration announces that it completed the work required under the Executive Order President Biden signed in September 2024, directing federal agencies to: 1) help schools improve school-based active shooter drills; and 2) combat the emerging threats of machinegun conversion devices and unserialized, 3D printed firearms.

New Federal Resources to Help Schools Improve School-Based Active Shooter Drills

Today, the U.S. Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security each are releasing new resources to help schools design and deploy school-based active shooter drills. The majority of schools use drills to prepare for an active shooter situation. However, there is very limited research on how to design and deploy these drills to maximize their impact and minimize any harms they might cause.

The Biden-Harris Administration has worked to dramatically reduce the impacts of gun violence on our schools, educators, and students. We have made the largest-ever federal government investment in youth mental health and unprecedented funding and resources for schools to prevent and respond to gun violence. We have also advanced strategies to keep guns out of the hands of students or those who seek to do harm, including by funding the implementation of red flag laws, enhancing background checks for people under 21 who are trying to buy guns, and equipping school leaders with tools to educate parents about the importance of safely storing any firearms in their homes.

While federal, state, and local leaders must continue these strategies to reduce the prevalence of gun violence in schools and communities, the new resources will help schools improve drills so they can effectively prepare for an active shooter situation while also preventing or minimizing any trauma school communities may experience in performing drills. The new resources are summarized below.

  • The U.S. Department of Education's resource, Considerations for Education Leaders in Preparing for Active Drills in Schools, provides substantive considerations school officials can use to plan for before, during, and after school-based active shooter drills. School administrators and other leaders may find this resource helpful when they are working to design and deploy school-based active shooter drills to save lives and minimize any unintended consequences. The information in this resource is based on robust outreach with practitioners, experts, and advocates, and are in line with existing research and evidence even as additional research is underway. For example, the resource explains that schools should provide advance notice about active shooter drills to school communities, including parents; avoid simulated gun violence (including highly sensorial elements like fake gunfire); be age-appropriate and designed in similar ways that schools teach academic content; address the needs of all staff and students (including those in need of special accommodations) and ensure all students (including those with disabilities and English Learners) are provided an equal opportunity to participate in safety training; and always provide a clear, consistent message accessible to all students that the event is a drill. This resource can be found here.
  • The Department of Health and Human Services' resource, Active Shooter Drills Research: An Annotated Bibliography, summarizes research on active shooter drills. While there is a need for additional research, this document compiles relevant research for school administrators and other leaders to reference when making decisions about drill design. Researchers may also find this resource useful when working to identify gaps in the research that need to be filled. This resource can be found here.
  • The Department of Homeland Security's resource, Active Shooter Landscape Assessment, summarizes the different types of active shooter drills currently in use in K-12 schools. School administrators and other leaders may find this document helpful when they want a better understanding of their choices when designing school-based active shooter drills. This resource can be found here.

Combatting Emerging Firearm Threats

Emerging firearm threats like machinegun conversion devices (MCDs) and 3D printed firearms are deadly new trends that are taking innocent lives. In September 2024, the President signed an Executive Order to establish the federal Emerging Firearm Threats Task Force and ordered it to deliver to him a report that includes a risk assessment of these new threats and new strategies to stop the proliferation of MCDs and 3D printed firearms. The Task Force submitted this report to the President in December 2024.

There are viable strategies to reduce the proliferation of emerging firearm threats, strategies that must continue if the United States is going to stay ahead of these emerging threats. Key strategies include:

  • Enforcement action that focuses on the source of the threats, including illegal import of physical products and the availability of computer code used for 3D printing.
  • Identifying and shutting down websites offering illegal products for sale.
  • Investing in promising technological solutions that can impede the ability to 3D print illegal products.

Below is a summary of key points on the risks compiled by the Task Force and potential strategies for combatting emerging firearms threats.

Potential Strategies for Combatting Emerging Firearms Threats

Following an assessment of the risks and data provided by the Task Force, OGVP identified the following strategies for combatting emerging firearms threats:

Machinegun Conversion Devices

Federal agencies have a number of capabilities and legal authorities to detect, intercept, and seize MCDs. The main pathways include: (1) seizing the websites that illegally offer MCDs for sale, (2) identifying MCDs at ports of entry, and (3) using traditional forensic tools and building new methods to trace 3D printed MCDs back to their origin.

  • Websites: Recently, federal authorities seized more than 350 Internet domains that foreign companies used to sell and illegally import MCDs into the United States in violation of the National Firearms Act and other laws prohibiting trafficking in counterfeit goods. The websites' domains were used to import illegal MCDs and silencers from China. Foreign sellers are continuing to establish these websites, so continued law enforcement prioritization of tracking and shuttering the illegal websites selling MCDs is essential. Law enforcement should continue to use traditional investigatory methods and new technology to efficiently identify and quickly shut down websites that illegally sell MCDs. OGVP supports a civil process for suspending websites, especially foreign-based websites, that are selling MCDs in the United States.
  • Port of Entry: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has targeted and tracked illegal MCDs since 2019. CBP has provided all ports of entry with guidance material that highlights trends in shipping and concealment tactics. CBP should continuously refresh these trainings and guidance to capture new tactics illegal MCD importers are using to avoid detection.
  • Tracing 3D Printed Devices: There are already established traditional forensic toolmark methods to determine the source of a 3D printed MCD. In addition, digital forensics techniques such as computed tomography and sonication may help identify the producer, the printer, or other specific information on a recovered MCD to help enforcement efforts. Over time and with advancements in this technology, MCDs could be traced and mapped back to supply chains. These technology solutions require federal, private sector, and philanthropic investment to become viable.

While there is no current U.S. law regulating the simple possession of computer code that could be used to 3D print MCDs, there are statutory authorities to prevent the illegal import and export of such code. Relevant authorities differentiate whether individuals placing MCD files onto the Internet are based in the United States or abroad.

  • Export: The Department of State (DOS) has jurisdiction over the export of MCDs and related technical data. Thus, DOS has jurisdiction over a person in the United States who places MCD files onto the Internet. But, unlike the Department of Commerce (DOC), DOS has not published a regulation explaining the contours of its jurisdiction. DOS should consider regulating computer code in the same fashion DOC regulates the computer code used for 3D printing firearms (which is explained in the next section) or moving jurisdiction for MCDs to DOC.
  • Import: The regulation of firearm imports falls under the jurisdiction of DOJ. The legal authority to regulate these imports derives from the same statute, the Arms Export Control Act, that grants DOS their authorities. However, while DOJ defines "defense articles" on the U.S. Munitions Import List to include MCDs produced by 3D printers, it does not explicitly cover the computer code used to 3D print MCDs or define "importation" to include downloading computer files from abroad. OGVP recommends that the interpretation of export and import laws be harmonized and applied to best prevent the distribution of computer code used to print MCDs.

There are also potential emerging software solutions to prevent or impede the 3D printing of MCDs. Due to the reliance of 3D printers on software to convert MCD 3D designs (.stl files) to G-code, the nature of distribution of software and files for printing, and potential partnerships between the federal government and software companies, there are a range of software-based approaches to addressing this problem. Members of industry and academia are working together on promising potential avenues to interrupt or block the printing of MCDs, which requires additional federal and philanthropic funding to continue the research and development. There is significant opportunity for continued collaboration between the federal government, technology companies, philanthropy, and civil society. Congress should authorize and fund the collaborative effort so it can continue to research live-saving solutions.

One limitation on stopping the proliferation of MCDs is that there are few laws related to the software and technology used to 3D print MCDs. In a manner consistent with the 1st and 2nd Amendments, OGVP urges Congress to prohibit the possession, distribution, and use of computer code that can be readily used in a 3D printer to make an MCD, and create liability for the websites that permit these files to be accessed.

Unserialized or Undetectable 3D Printed Firearms

While there is no current U.S. law regulating the simple possession of computer code that could be used to 3D print firearms, there are statutory authorities to prevent the illegal import and export of such code. Relevant authorities differentiate whether individuals placing files onto the Internet are based in the United States or abroad. OGVP recommends that the interpretation of export and import laws be harmonized and applied to best prevent the distribution of computer code used to print unserialized or undetectable 3D printed firearms.

  • Export: The Department of Commerce (DOC) has promulgated a regulation for addressing computer code that can be used to 3D print firearms pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act.[1] DOC regulates code that is "ready for insertion" into a 3D printer and posted on the Internet. DOC's policy covers code that can directly interface with a 3D printer (e.g., G-code) as well as the code of the 3D design that only needs to be converted to G-code through widely available "slicer" software and with minimal additional information or manipulation from the individual.[2] This provision applies to individuals in the United States who place code on the Internet. Further interagency collaboration would assist DOC in identifying instances where an individual posts offending code on the Internet.
  • Import: The regulation of foreign actors who place computer code on the Internet that could be accessed by individuals in the United States and used to 3D print firearms falls under the jurisdiction of the DOJ. The legal authority to regulate these imports is substantially similar to the statute that is used by DOC, the Export Control Reform Act. However, while DOJ defines "defense articles" on the U.S. Munitions Import List to include firearms produced by 3D printers, it does not explicitly cover the computer code used to 3D print firearms or define "importation" to include downloading computer files from abroad. OGVP notes that these are areas where regulations can be strengthened.

DOJ has not engaged with the additive manufacturing industry on strategies to impede the 3D printing of firearms, but many of the same strategies for addressing 3D printed MCDs may be available. OGVP suggests that one place to start a collaboration would be on fully plastic firearms that can evade a metal detector.

Like MCDs, one limitation in stopping the proliferation of 3D printed firearms is the lack of laws directly addressing the software and technology related to 3D printing of firearms. Because of the risk posed by 3D printing firearms to enable prohibited individuals to access firearms, facilitate gun trafficking and illegal gun dealing, and create firearms that evade metal detectors, OGVP proposes that in a manner consistent with the 1st and 2nd Amendments, Congress should prohibit the distribution of software that is ready to be used in a 3D printer to make a firearm, including software that can be easily converted to that form.

Additionally, the Undetectable Firearms Act should be modernized and updated to fully capture the technical specifications of the firearms that can evade security and include prohibitions on the computer code used to 3D print undetectable firearms.

Risk Assessment

Machinegun Conversion Devices

MCDs are a clear and present danger that pose a substantial threat to public safety and law enforcement because they convert semiautomatic rifles and pistols into fully automatic firearms that fire at rates comparable to military machineguns - up to thousands of rounds per minute. Often small and difficult to identify, MCDs are inexpensive to make and, due to their size and concealability, much easier to traffic than complete weapons. The devices are easy to obtain, install, and use. For purposes of federal law, MCDs are classified as machineguns, even when not installed on a firearm, and are subject to all the restrictions in the federal firearm laws applicable to the manufacture, possession, and use of machineguns.[3]

From January 1, 2022, to October 24, 2024, there were approximately 12,374 suspected MCDs recovered by law enforcement agencies and submitted for tracing to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). In that period, the top ten recovery states comprised 64.4% (7,956) of the 12,360 MCDs recovered in the United States. Florida (1,516), Illinois (1,376), Texas (1,045), Montana (1,030), and North Dakota (999) have submitted nearly half of all domestic recoveries (48.3% of 12,360).[4] This total count of MCDs is very likely underinclusive as many MCDs are not submitted into the tracing system or are not identified by law enforcement officers at the time of recovery due to their inconspicuous nature. One reason that so many MCDs are not identified by law enforcement is because they are not illegal under many state laws, and therefore, local law enforcement officers may not have been trained to identify and confiscate them.

The two principal ways that MCDs are currently acquired in the United States are through illegal imports and illegal 3D printing. Although the MCDs themselves are machineguns and individuals cannot lawfully possess them under federal law and the laws of about half of the states, except under very limited circumstances, possession of the computer code used to produce them is currently unregulated under federal law.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has targeted and seized an estimated 16,000 MCDs at the ports of entry since 2019, with the number of seizures increasing between FY22 and FY24. The import trends have changed over time with shipments now containing a higher volume of MCDs. The shipment size has increased from 1-2 MCDs per shipment to upwards of 50 per shipment.

MCD importers often use websites readily available to the general public to market their illegal products with websites operating like traditional e-commerce sites where products can be compared, purchased, and shipped to a customer. A recent investigation by federal law enforcement shut down 350 websites and identified that MCD importers were also using social media accounts (Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok) to market their MCD business and run ads that target certain user accounts in the United States. MCDs imported into the United States are almost exclusively from the People's Republic of China. After a purchase is made, MCDs are mislabeled on customs invoices as random parts, toys, and other innocuous items to thwart detection.

Software files that can be used to 3D print MCDs are available to the public on the Internet for little or no cost and can be downloaded in minutes on any phone or computer with access to the Internet. Once the design file is converted to G-code (the code necessary to 3D print an item), an inexpensive 3D printer (less than $150 or accessed for free at a public library) can be used to quickly print a functional MCD. The 3D printed version of an MCD is nearly as reliable as the metal part.

Unserialized or Undetectable 3D Printed Firearms

The emergence of unserialized, 3D printed firearms pose significant domestic and international threats. Domestically, 3D printers can produce firearm components that, when assembled, create fully-functional, untraceable firearms. While it is legal for individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms to make their own firearms, whether using 3D printing or otherwise, these types of firearms can create serious challenges for law enforcement, especially when in the hands of prohibited individuals, gun traffickers or unlicensed sellers. Unserialized firearms cannot legally be sold by gun dealers nor provided to others otherwise prohibited from receiving or possessing firearms. Internationally, Canadian authorities report a rise in 3D printed firearms, although illicit handguns in Canada are primarily sourced from stolen or smuggled U.S. weapons.

Unserialized firearms pose unique threats to public safety. Law enforcement relies on the tracing of firearms recovered at crime scenes to identify the most recent purchaser of a firearm, thereby creating an investigative lead. It is nearly impossible to trace unserialized firearms because they lack the necessary identification markings upon which tracing relies. A law enforcement officer who encounters an unserialized firearm at a crime scene will therefore be unable to generate an investigative lead from a firearm trace. In addition, unserialized firearms may not be traced to their point of origin, precluding firearm trafficking investigations from determining larger illegal trafficking patterns and those responsible for the trafficking. These public safety concerns are the same whether the firearm is assembled from a ghost gun kit or 3D printed.

Undetectable firearms are not detectable by standard metal detectors and pose a particularly acute threat because they can be smuggled into sensitive areas such as airports, courthouses, government facilities, and large arenas. Undetectable firearms may be made entirely of polymer, without metal, which is why they are undetectable by standard metal detectors. While unserialized and undetectable firearms pose distinct threats, they are related because undetectable firearms may be produced by consumers using commercially available 3D printers. The availability of undetectable firearms presents serious threats to public safety and national security. The availability of 3D printing and files to print an undetectable firearm enables individuals to bypass background checks, border control, and other security measures, increasing the potential for prohibited persons, terrorists, and criminal organizations to use these weapons.

Like simple possession of the computer code for 3D printing MCDs, simple possession of the computer code that enables a person to 3D print an undetectable firearm is not currently illegal under U.S. law. The computer code needed for 3D printing can be downloaded or received from individuals on forums and purchased through web-based marketplaces, including on the dark web. Though some expertise is needed, 3D printer users with minimal additional technical skills can successfully 3D print a firearm.

Transnational and terrorist criminal organizations, including cartels, have increasingly exploited 3D printing technology to manufacture firearms. This capability allows them to bypass traditional supply chains and border controls, making it easier to arm their networks without detection. These groups' use of 3D printed firearms amplifies violence, disrupts security, and complicates efforts to combat organized crime. The ease of production and distribution of 3D printed weapons, by or for the use of criminal or terrorist organizations, poses threats not only to the U.S., but also to its partner nations, straining law enforcement and national security measures. The trend of 3D printed firearms' use in transnational crime underscores the need for coordinated international regulations and prevention strategies to address the proliferation of these weapons.


[1] 15 C.F.R. § 734.7(c). "The following remains subject to the EAR: "software" or "technology" for the production of a firearm, or firearm frame or receiver, controlled under ECCNs 0A501, 0A506, 0A507, or 0A509, that is made available by posting on the internet in an electronic format, such as AMF or G-code, and is ready for insertion into a computer numerically controlled machine tool, additive manufacturing equipment, or any other equipment that makes use of the "software" or "technology" to produce the firearm frame or receiver or complete firearm."

[2] In 2020, DOC provided public guidance on what types of files are covered in an FAQ document available on the BIS website. See https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/policy-guidance/2572-faqs-for-the-commerce-category-i-iii-firearms-rule-posted-on-bis-website-7-7-20/file. If a person is unsure whether the criteria of section 734.7(c) are met, including whether the "technology" or "software" is ready for insertion into a computer numerically controlled machine tool, additive manufacturing equipment, or any other equipment, persons with such "technology" or "software" can submit an official classification request to BIS using the free online submission system, called SNAP-R, available on the BIS website to receive an official classification.

[3] See, Title 26, U.S.C., Section 5845(b) and Title 18, U.S.C., Section 922(o).

[4] Note that certain of these seizure statistics may include Forced-Reset Triggers, and the legality of certain types of Forced-Reset Triggers is subject to ongoing litigation. Compare United States v. Rare Breed Triggers, LLC, 690 F. Supp. 3d 51, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) ("[T]he Government is likely to succeed on the merits of its contention that the FRT-15," a type of Forced-Reset Trigger, "is an illegal machinegun.") with Nat'l Ass'n for Gun Rts., Inc. v. Garland, No. 4:23-CV-00830-O, 2024 WL 3517504, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2024) (holding that the FRT-15 and WOT, a similar type of Forced-Reset Trigger, are not illegal machineguns).

/Public Release. This material from the originating organization/author(s) might be of the point-in-time nature, and edited for clarity, style and length. Mirage.News does not take institutional positions or sides, and all views, positions, and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author(s).View in full here.