Covid-19 showed us how vulnerable the world is to pandemics - but what if the next pandemic were somehow engineered? How would the world respond - and could we stop it happening in the first place?
There is a great opportunity to take a joined-up approach to managing the risks posed by engineered pandemics
Clare Bryant
These are some of the questions being addressed by a new initiative launched today at the University of Cambridge, which seeks to address the urgent challenge of managing the risks of future engineered pandemics.
The Engineered Pandemics Risk Management Programme aims to understand the social and biological factors that might drive an engineered pandemic and to make a major contribution to building the UK's capability for managing these risks. It will build a network of experts from academia, government, and industry to tackle the problem.
Increased security threats from state and non-state actors, combined with increased urbanisation and global mobility, means the threat of deliberate pathogen release must be taken seriously as must other intertwined aspects of pandemic risk such as mis- and disinformation, the erosion of trust in a number of institutions and an increasingly volatile geopolitical context. Further potential risks are posed by recent developments in gene-editing tools and artificial intelligence, which have rapidly advanced technological capability that may make it easier to engineer potential pandemic pathogens.
Professor Clare Bryant from the Department of Medicine at the University of Cambridge said: "There is a great opportunity to take a joined-up approach to managing the risks posed by engineered pandemics. We need experts and agencies across the spectrum to work together to develop a better understanding of who or what might drive such events and what their likely impact would be. And we need evidence-informed policies and networks in place that would help us respond to - or better still, prevent - such an eventuality."
- The aims of the Engineered Pandemics Risk Management Programme are:
- To develop the conceptual underpinnings for the risk management of engineered pandemics based on interdisciplinary research
- To support the capability of the UK's engineered pandemic risk policy and practice, including building and maintaining networks that connect government, academia and industry.
- To strengthen the international networks that will support this work globally
There are four main strands of work:
Social determinants of engineered pandemic threat
This strand will look at the actors who have the potential to engineer harmful pathogens, either deliberately or accidentally. It will ask questions such as: What could motivate bioterrorism in the coming decades? Who might the relevant actors be? What are the kinds of engineered pandemic that someone might want to create?
Dr Rob Doubleday, Executive Director of the Centre for Science and Policy at the University of Cambridge, said: "The common narrative is that there's a wide range of potential actors out there who want to create bioweapons but don't yet have the technical means. But in fact, there's been very little work to really understand who these people might be, and their relationship to emerging technology. To explore these questions, we need a broad network including social scientists, biosecurity researchers, criminologists, experts in geopolitics and counterterrorism."
The strand will also look at the governance of scientific research in areas that may facilitate an engineered pandemic, whether unwittingly or maliciously, aiming to deliver a policy framework that enables freedom of intellectual research while managing real and apparent risk in infectious disease research.
Professor Bryant said: "As scientists, we're largely responsible for policing our own work and ensuring integrity, trustworthiness and transparency, and for considering the consequences of new knowledge and how it might be used. But with the rapid progress of genomic technologies and AI, self-regulation becomes more difficult to manage. We need to find governance frameworks that balance essential scientific progress with its potential misapplication."
Biological determinants of engineered pandemic threat
Recognising that the most likely cause of an engineered pandemic would be the deliberate release of a naturally-occurring pathogen - viral or bacterial, for example - rather than a man-made pathogen, this strand aims to understand what might make a particular pathogen infectious and how our immune systems respond to infection. This knowledge will allow researchers to screen currently available drugs to prevent or treat infection and to design vaccines quickly should a pandemic occur.
Modelling threats and risk management of engineered pandemics
The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted practical problems of dealing with pandemic infections, from the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE) to ensuring a sufficient supply of vaccine doses and availability of key medications. Modelling the potential requirements of a pandemic, how they could be delivered, how ventilation systems could be modified, what biosafety measures could be taken, for example, are all key challenges for managing any form of pandemic. This strand will address how existing modelling approaches would need to be adapted for a range of plausible engineered pandemics.
Policy innovation challenges
Working with the policy community, the Cambridge team will co-create research that directly addresses policy needs and involves policy makers. It will support policy makers in experimenting with more joined-up approaches through testing, learning and adapting solutions developed in partnership.
The Engineered Pandemics Risk Management Programme is supported by a £5.25 million donation to the Centre for Research in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences (CRASSH) at the University of Cambridge. The team intends it to form a central component of a future Pandemic Risk Management Centre, for which it is now fundraising.
Professor Joanna Page, Director of CRASSH, said: "Cambridge has strengths across a broad range of disciplines - from genetics and immunology to mathematical modelling to existential risk and policy engagement - that can make a much-needed initiative such as this a success."
