France, Germany and the UK (E3) gave a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on Iran's implementation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPoA
Chair,
On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank Director-General Grossi for his latest report on Iran's nuclear programme.
As always, we commend the Agency's professional, independent and impartial work and their objective reporting. Unfortunately, the Agency's findings are, once again, highly concerning.
Iran's enriched uranium stockpile has further expanded over the current reporting period. Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 %. It now has well over four IAEA significant quantities of uranium enriched up 60%, which the IAEA defines as the approximate amount of nuclear material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Its overall stockpile of enriched uranium is now over 32 times the limit Iran committed to in the JCPoA.
Over the past five months, Iran has also substantially expanded its overall production capacity by installing and operating new advanced centrifuges; in the reporting period, it has installed six additional cascades of advanced centrifuges at Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz, thus further enhancing its enrichment capacity.
Iran continues obstructing the work of the IAEA, which has had detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to effectively verify and monitor Iran's nuclear programme and to provide assurance of the programme's exclusively peaceful nature:
As a result of this lack of transparency, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate, as the DG reiterates in his report.
In addition, Iran is upholding its politically motivated de-designation of several experienced Agency inspectors, which seriously affects the Agency's ability to conduct its verification in Iran, particularly at the enrichment facilities. Iran has now offered to consider "the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors". Even if that consideration becomes a reality, it will still not fully compensate the loss of Agency expertise in this field.
The DG's report also notes that it has been more than three years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol, depriving the Agency of complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran.
Chair,
In his latest report, the DG references discussions about Iran halting expanding its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60%. If Iran were to stop enriching uranium up to 60%, this would constitute a step that is long overdue. Enrichment to such levels not only is a blatant violation of Iran's commitments under the JCPoA; but, as the DG again states in his report, Iran is the only state without nuclear weapons in the world to do so. We should also remain vigilant that even if Iran were to proceed with this measure, Iran would still retain an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60% at any point. We therefore call on Iran to not only offer halting high-level enrichment but to immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.
Chair,
Let us be clear: Iran's choices and decisions regarding its nuclear activities are the source of this long-standing proliferation crisis. It is Iran that has escalated this situation by further departing from its JCPoA commitments. We therefore urge Iran to:
Halt and reverse its nuclear escalation and refrain from making threats to produce nuclear weapons;
Return to the limits imposed by the JCPoA, in particular those regarding enrichment;
Implement the Iran-IAEA March 2023 Joint statement and the commitments it made regarding transparency and cooperation with the IAEA including re-applying all transparency measures that it stopped in February 2021;
Allow the Agency to install surveillance and monitoring equipment where requested;
Re-implement and swiftly ratify its Additional Protocol; and
Fully reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw the designations of experienced inspectors.
Chair,
Iran's behaviour in the nuclear realm is a threat to international security and undermines the global non-proliferation system. We recall that in 2022, Iran twice refused a negotiated outcome and instead chose to escalate and expand its nuclear programme to alarming levels. The international community must remain firm in its determination to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and we stand ready to use all diplomatic levers to achieve this goal.
The latest statements, including by high-ranking officials, about Iran's purported technical capability to produce nuclear weapons and the possibility of changing its so-called nuclear doctrine are contrary to Iran's commitments under the JCPoA and its preamble and are incompatible with Iran's status as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT.
We ask the Director General to keep the Board of Governors informed on the status of Iran's nuclear programme by periodical and, if deemed necessary, extraordinary reporting. We ask for this report to be made public.
Thank you.
