Experts Unite to Tackle Shadow Fleet Risks

Department of State

The following text was jointly agreed upon by United States, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom following recent engagements.

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On Friday January 10, 2025 in Copenhagen, Denmark convened a multilateral group of experts to develop concrete plans to further counter Russia's shadow fleet including its high-risk activities in the Baltic Sea. Already, officials have built on that in-person engagement with follow-on virtual consultations to identify next steps and establish strong working relations. The group includes sanctions, energy, legal, and maritime experts from the United States, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The initial meeting was called on the basis of the new measure by the convening European countries to request relevant proof of insurance from suspected shadow fleet vessels that the NB8++ countries jointly announced at the JEF Leaders' Summit in Tallinn on 16-17 December 2024, and taking notice of the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki 14 January 2024.

We are united in our commitment to further deter and disrupt high-risk maritime activities related to the shadow fleet together, especially in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.

The shadow fleet comprises vessels that may engage in illegitimate and high-risk shipping practices for the purpose of circumventing sanctions, especially the Oil Price Cap set by the G7+. Shadow fleet vessels raise serious concerns for both the public and private sectors, as these vessels evade compliance with safety, environmental, and liability standards, not least due to the potential inadequate insurance.

Over the last three years, Russia has significantly expanded its shadow fleet, which contributes to its ability to fund its unjust and illegal war in Ukraine. Coastal States face elevated threats from Russia's various maritime actions, including in relation to their shipping and offshore activities; critical undersea infrastructure; and marine environment, as well as wildlife.

The Russian shadow fleet has led to an increased risk of an environmental disaster in the Baltic Sea as well as globally. Obfuscating vessel positions through GPS interference and AIS manipulation has increased the risk of an accident. Recent events have shown that the shadow fleet used by Russia may also pose a risk to critical maritime infrastructure.

We applaud recent efforts to address these developments, such as:

We are determined to further enhance our cooperation to counter high-risk maritime activity related to the shadow fleet in the coming time, including by:

  • Working on modalities for swift information-sharing on vessel insurance and other risk criteria to inform our sanctions development and other policy responses, particularly noting that insurance information will be requested from suspected shadow fleet vessels by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom;
  • Aligning our sanctions designations further and pursuing more proactive measures, including enforcement towards parties involved in their violation/circumvention;
  • Supporting workstreams related to best practices and standard operating procedures to deter and address harmful activities, including vessels that damage undersea infrastructure;
  • Exploring policy options to promote accountability and full economic liability for harm-causing actions;
  • Highlighting and shining future light on the risks associated with Russia's shadow fleet together with academia, researchers, and the legitimate shipping industry;
  • Coordinating closely with likeminded partners, especially NB8++ countries; and
  • Maintaining close and regular engagement and information-sharing to anticipate and counter future maritime threats.

Collectively, we are committed to countering the shadow fleet and related threats, holding enablers to account - including through sanctions-related actions - for the risks they pose and the support they are providing to Russia's war against Ukraine.

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