The media, especially social media, always looks for simple answers when it comes to the war in Ukraine. There are four main misconceptions about the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the war and pro-war propaganda.
The first misconception is that the Russian Orthodox Church is against Ukraine. Orthodox Christianity operates within so-called canonical territories. For the Russian Church, her canonical territories include most of the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine. In other words, Ukrainians are believed to be her own congregation, brainwashed and misled by the evil West and heretics.
This is partly true because the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is one of the most powerful Ukrainian Orthodox churches, especially in the East of the country where most of the military action takes place. However, this Church suffers the most damage caused by the Russian military forces to religious communities in Ukraine, up to 65%. Consequently, the leadership started the process of gaining independence from Moscow, autocephaly, though less than enthusiastic, because the Church is split over obedience to Kyiv or Moscow.
The second misconception represents Patriarch Kirill as a grey cardinal of sorts, Putin's right-hand man, and one of the most important political figures in Russia. This is a huge exaggeration. Although symbolically very visible, the political influence of the Church is limited to the spheres of religion and family values, and she has little to no say in most of the issues of domestic and especially foreign policy.
The Patriarch himself was caught off guard by the war in February 2022. Until early March, he could not find the right words in his public speeches and sermons. And this is understandable because he has so much to lose. He is currently losing a significant part of his congregation in Ukraine, his authority as a religious and spiritual leader, choosing loyalty to Putin over his pastoral and moral obligations to his Church.
Thirdly, whenever the Russian Orthodox Church is discussed, the Patriarch alone represents her most of the time. This is a big generalization and simplification. The Patriarch is not the Church. He is a very important symbolic figure, especially within the leadership structures. But the Church is too big and ancient. She is more of an umbrella than an organization or an ecclesiastical body. There are all kinds of groups, organizations, clubs, institutions, congregations, parishes, monasteries, educational institutions, and uncountable individuals. They are loosely united under this umbrella, and they cannot have a coherent position on any issue, including the war in Ukraine.
Lastly, Russian pro-war propaganda is not based on Orthodox Christianity. Although it plays a role, the most important patriotic narrative in Russia is the cult of war. It was not the war in Ukraine, but the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), which was the name of the Soviet part in World War II after the German invasion. The Soviet Union lost about 27 million people in that war. The heroes, symbols, and memories of the war are much more powerful and sacred than the Orthodox Church has ever strived to be. Hence, the Ukrainian authorities and military are called Nazis, hence the anti-West rhetoric, and hence the pro-war propaganda.
When it comes to simplifications and generalizations, both the media and social media tend to reduce huge and complex institutions to their leadership. Whatever the Patriarch, and maybe key bishops and spokesmen say, is considered the position, opinion, stance, or will of the whole Church. The Russian Church is more than a thousand years old, it embraces millions of adherents, and even formally it is a very complex and sophisticated institution. Hundreds of priests persecuted for their anti-war position and an enormous diversity of the faithful testify to the simple fact that the Church is much more than just the Patriarch.
