Background
● This report summarizes and assesses information in the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) quarterly report, dated February 26, 2025, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including Iran's compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This report also includes some of the highlights from the IAEA's parallel report, Iran NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
● Although this report and the parallel NPT report serves to highlight Iran's multiple violations of the JCPOA and the NPT and its increased capabilities to make weapon-grade uranium, they obscure perhaps the most critical concern. Iran's nuclear weaponization program is steadily making progress, out of sight of the inspectors and the world. The urgent need is to place IAEA inspections at the heart of relations with Iran and reaffirm that Iran will never be allowed to get a nuclear weapon.
Findings
● Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 174 kg of WGU in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 7 nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
● Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in less than one week.
● In front of the inspectors' eyes, Iran is undertaking the near-final step of breaking out, now converting its 20 percent stock of enriched uranium into 60 percent enriched uranium but at a currently unsustainable rate (see below).
● Iran's total stocks of enriched uranium and its centrifuge capacity at Fordow and the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) combined are sufficient to make enough WGU for over ten nuclear weapons in one month and 12-13 in two months. By the end of the fourth month, Iran would have used up its stocks of enriched uranium and produced enough WGU for 17 weapons.
● Because of the greatly expanded production of 60 percent enriched uranium, the IAEA requested and received permission for strengthened safeguards at Fordow.
● The IAEA also reports the implementation of a "strengthened safeguards approach […] at a nuclear material storage at Esfahan", an important development given that a large amount of Iran's 60 percent HEU and 20 percent enriched uranium stock have previously been reported to be stored at Esfahan. Exactly how much of Iran's enriched uranium stocks are held at Esfahan, however, compared to other locations, is no longer reported.
● The IAEA pointedly admonishes Iran, stating: "The production and accumulation of high enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear weapon State to do so, adds to the Agency's concerns."
● The IAEA's efforts to verify Iran's nuclear activities, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, continue to be seriously affected by Iran's decision last fall to withdraw the designation of several experienced inspectors. The IAEA repeatedly requested that Iran reconsider this inappropriate, political act, including in a June 2024 Board of Governors censure resolution, but Iran has not done so.
● As of February 8, 2025, the net overall enriched uranium stock, including all levels of enrichment and all chemical forms, had increased by 1690 kg, from 6604.4 kg to 8294.4 kg (Uranium mass or U mass).
● As of February 8, Iran's stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was 274.8 kg (as measured in U mass) or 406.5 kg (hex mass). This represents a net increase in the stock in the form of uranium hexafluoride of 92.5 kg (U mass) since the previous reporting period. It does include 5.7 kg of enriched uranium (U mass) that is assessed to be enriched above 20 percent but far below 60 percent, as it was discharged from the cascade into a dump tank rather than collected as product.
● At the FFEP, Iran made significant changes in its production of 60 percent HEU during this reporting period. On December 5, Iran started to use 20 percent feedstock rather than 5 percent feedstock to produce 60 percent HEU in the two interconnected IR-6 cascades used for 60 percent HEU production since November 2022. This change led to an average monthly production of 31.9 kg 60 percent HEU in the last two months of the reporting period, a near seven-fold increase in average monthly 60 percent HEU production at the FFEP compared to previous months. The two IR-6 cascades used include one of which is easily modifiable to change operations and enrich uranium to higher levels.
● Iran continued to produce 60 percent HEU from 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) feed in two pairs of interconnected advanced centrifuge cascades at the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP).
● Adding the average monthly production of 60 percent HEU at the PFEP, which remained similar to the previous reporting period at 3.3 kg per month, Iran is producing 35 kg (U mass) or 52 kg (hex mass) of 60 percent enriched uranium per month on average. It could produce about 634 kg (hex mass) or 429 kg (U mass) of near 60 percent enriched uranium per year.
● However, in multiplying its 60 percent HEU production, Iran is using significant amounts of 20 percent enriched uranium as feedstock, a rate which is not sustainable unless Iran significantly increases 20 percent enriched uranium production. It used an average of 112 kg (U mass) of 20 percent enriched uranium as feed per month, compared to an average monthly production of 12 kg.
● This led to a reduction in Iran's near 20 percent enriched uranium stock of 232.4 kg (U mass), for a total stock of 606.8 kg (U mass) as of February 8.
● At this feed and production rate, Iran could sustain the high 60 percent HEU production for approximately six months after February 8.
● Iran now has nearly 13,355 advanced centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow, where most are deployed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).
● Including the installed IR-1 centrifuges at the FEP, PFEP, and FFEP brings the total number of installed centrifuges to about 20,600. It should be noted that many advanced centrifuges are deployed but not enriching uranium, and the IR-1 centrifuges have a reduced ability to enrich uranium.
● During the reporting period, Iran installed two new IR-2m cascades and six new IR-4 cascades at Natanz, for a total of 39 IR-2m cascades, 27 of which are currently operating, and 18 total IR-4 cascades, 12 of which are operating.
● In a remarkable show of confidence, or overconfidence, in its ability to operate the IR-6 centrifuge, and prevent centrifuge fratricide after a centrifuge crashes, Iran informed the IAEA that it intends to install a single cascade of IR-6 centrifuges consisting of 1152 centrifuges.
● The quantity of Iran's enriching centrifuges increased during this reporting period, to almost 16,900 centrifuges.
● Iran has a total installed enrichment capacity of roughly 58,800 swu/year. Its enriching centrifuge capacity is less, about 43,800 swu/year.
● Iran's stockpile of near 5 percent LEU in the form of UF6 increased by 1060.6 kg (U mass) from 2594.8 kg to 3655.4 kg (U mass), or 5407.4 kg (hex mass).
● In general, Iran has not prioritized stockpiling uranium enriched between 2 to 5 percent. This choice is at odds with Iran's contention that its primary goal is to accumulate 4 to 5 percent enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactor fuel. Instead, Iran has used this stock extensively to produce 60 percent enriched uranium, far beyond Iran's civilian needs.
● The IAEA again reports that Iran will not start commissioning of the Arak reactor, now called the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), or IR-20, until at least 2025, with operation expected to start in 2026. Inspectors did not observe any significant changes at the reactor compared to the situation in the last reporting period.
● Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) to its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the JCPOA's additional monitoring arrangements on February 23, 2021. Iran's actions and its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA across a wide range of monitoring issues causes the IAEA to consistently express doubt about understanding key aspects of Iran's nuclear activities. Without the AP in place, the IAEA has neither been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran nor received updated declarations from Iran.
● The IAEA reports that it has "lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate], which it will not be possible to restore."
● The IAEA concludes that "Iran's decision to remove all of the Agency's equipment previously installed in Iran for JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring activities has also had detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme."
● Although the IAEA can ascertain the number of centrifuges deployed at Fordow and Natanz, it cannot know how many more Iran has made and stored or deployed at an undeclared site. A risk is that Iran will accumulate a secret stock of advanced centrifuges, deployable in the future at a clandestine enrichment plant, which would only need to house a relatively few advanced centrifuge cascades to enrich Iran's current stock of 60 percent HEU to WGU. At the least, this situation complicates any future verification effort and contributes to uncertainty about the status of Iran's nuclear activities and facilities.
● Iran is still not implementing modified Code 3.1, despite it being a legal obligation for Iran and the Board having called for Iran to do so in its resolutions.
● The IAEA in its latest assessment on Iran's compliance with NPT safeguards notes that it arrived at an "impasse" regarding resolving "outstanding safeguards issues" pertaining to the agency's multi-year investigation of Iran's possible nuclear weapons work.
● As in several past Iran NPT safeguards reports, the IAEA has not changed its assessment regarding the presence of undeclared nuclear material and/or activities at four sites - Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, Marivan, and Turquz-Abad. It clearly states it assesses "that nuclear material was used in undeclared nuclear-related activities at Lavisan-Shian and that nuclear material was also planned to be used in undeclared nuclear-related activities at Marivan." The latter refers to a planned "cold test" of a nuclear explosive, typically the last major test prior to finalizing the nuclear weapon design.
● The IAEA concluded that Iran's nuclear declaration is incomplete, in essence stating that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
● The IAEA continued to conclude that its verification results at the uranium conversion facility demonstrated that uranium involved in former uranium metal production experiments remains unaccounted for and cannot be explained by accountancy measurement errors. No progress was made on this issue.
● Combined with Iran's refusal to resolve outstanding safeguards violations and the program's unresolved nuclear weapons dimensions, the IAEA has a significantly reduced ability to monitor Iran's complex and growing nuclear program. The IAEA's ability to detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and other capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly diminished.
