The global illicit drugs trade is estimated to be worth at least half a trillion US dollars each year. Drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin generate large revenues all along their supply chains , from where the products (and precursor materials) are grown or made - principally Colombia and Bolivia, China, Afghanistan, and the "golden triangle" of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand - to wherever the finished drugs are consumed.
Authors
- Mark Berry
Lecturer In Criminology, Bournemouth University
- R.V. Gundur
Senior Lecturer, University of the West of Scotland
Earnings in the illicit drug trade are variable. Few people will make the kind of money that once put the Mexican former cartel boss Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán on the Forbes list of global billionaires . But while drug "kingpins" are the industry's biggest individual earners, they do not hold the majority of the drug money that is generated throughout the global supply chain.
Despite their frequent glamorisation in film and TV portrayals, drug cartels are basically international logistics companies. They work with distributors in different countries who deliver the drugs to regional wholesalers, who in turn supply the local retailers (dealers) who sell drugs to individuals.
Everyone along the supply chain takes their cut , with most people making much more modest incomes than the millionaire drug traffickers of narcocorrido lore. In our interviews with illicit drug entrepreneurs in the US and UK , we routinely spoke to sellers whose incomes ranged from pocket money to providing a moderately comfortable life.
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Around 70% to 80% of the overall revenue generated by illicit drugs is shared among the many wholesale and street-level dealers in destination countries such as the UK and US, where the price per gram is at its highest . How this money moves and is used to sustain the illicit drug trade should be an important part of any worthwhile counter-narcotics strategy. But it rarely is.
Professional money launderers
The people and organisations responsible for laundering drug revenues - that is, transforming them into untraceable money that can easily be spent, or into assets that can be held or sold - often exist under the radar of law enforcement and the media.
Yet the ways illicit drug money is laundered are hardly a mystery. Techniques include wire transfers to offshore bank accounts, investments in shell companies or deposits in cash businesses, and buying foreign currencies or (to a small extent) cryptocurrencies . In addition, the straightforward physical transportation of cash across national borders is an often-used method known as a "bulk cash transfer".
The largest players in the illicit drugs industry, such as international cartels, national distributors and large-scale wholesalers, often use professional money launderers - some of whom have seemingly reputable jobs in the financial sector. In one recent case, US financial regulators fined TD Bank US$3 billion (£2.4 billion) - a record penalty for a bank - for facilitating the laundering of millions of dollars of drug cartel money.
Over six years, more than 90% of the bank's transactions went unmonitored, enabling "three money laundering networks to collectively transfer more than US$670 million through TD Bank accounts". Then-US attorney general Merrick Garland commented: "By making its services convenient for criminals, [TD Bank] became one."
Some money laundering networks are as global as the drug supply chains they service. In June 2024, the US Department of Justice's (DoJ) multi-year "Operation Fortune Runner" investigation saw LA-based associates of Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel charged with conspiring with money-laundering groups linked to a Chinese underground banking network. According to the IRS's head of criminal investigation, Guy Ficco:
Drug traffickers generate immense amounts of cash through their illicit operations. This case is a prime example of Chinese money launderers working hand-in-hand with drug traffickers to try to legitimise profits generated by drug activities.
According to the DoJ , "many wealthy Chinese nationals" barred from transferring large amounts to the US by the Chinese government's capital flight restrictions seek informal alternatives to the conventional banking system - including via schemes to launder illicit drug money. The DoJ explained how this works:
The China-based investor contacts an individual who has US dollars available to sell in the United States. This seller of US dollars provides identifying information for a bank account in China, with instructions for the investor to deposit Chinese currency (renminbi) in that account. Once the owner of the account sees the deposit, an equivalent amount of US dollars is released to the buyer in the United States.
These arrangements are not unique to Chinese actors. Similar arrangements occur throughout the world, including schemes to leverage the black market peso exchange and the Hawala international money transfer system .
Professional launderers are both creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in the global financial system. Such corruption allows suspicious transactions to occur without proper checks or oversight. This not only reduces transparency in the financial system but erodes public trust in it.
How cartels launder their money
International drug cartels and national wholesalers have a smaller markup on their transactions, compared with retailers. But because they are responsible for moving enormous quantities of illicit drugs, they still generate millions of dollars worth of revenue .
The most prolific known drug distributors in US history, Margarito Flores Jr and his twin brother Pedro, delivered billions of dollars worth of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines to their US and Canadian wholesale clients between 1998 and 2009. They were working for Guzmán and Ismeal "El Mayo" Zambada García, then leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, as well as the Mexican Beltrán Leyva brothers whose cartel bore their surname .
Today, Margarito Flores Jr trains law enforcement across the US in the methods he and his brother used to traffic drugs and run their business. In January 2015, both men were sentenced to 14 years for drug trafficking - Margarito Flores Jr would later reach out to one of this article's authors (R.V. Gundur) after reading his book, Trying to Make It: The Enterprises, Gangs, and People of the American Drug Trade , which includes a comprehensive account of the Flores crew's activities.
In a subsequent interview, he told us: "My brother and I estimate that, if we added up all of the money we sent back to Mexico over the decade we sold drugs, it was probably more than US$3.5 billion."
The billions they remitted to Mexico were used by Guzmán, Zambada and the Beltrán Levya brothers not only to expand their drug businesses, but to corrupt powerful figures such as Mexico's former secretary of public security , Genaro García Luna .
García Luna, who was Mexico's highest-ranking law enforcement official from 2006 to 2012, was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison in October 2024 after being found guilty of taking millions of dollars in bribes from the Sinaloa cartel, as well as enabling the trafficking of more than a million kilograms of cocaine into the US. Flores explained to us:
It's important to understand that corruption impacts people at all levels of government. Our payoffs included local police and other people in the community, up to higher-positioned people in government. Lots of that money ended up funding the violent conflicts between cartels.
While there has been widespread coverage of cartel drug money being laundered through high-profile businesses and banks such as Wachovia and HSBC , Flores suggested that "the money involved in the drug trade is a lot more than anybody really can understand". The reason for this, he said, is that it's very hard to track the flow of hard cash via lorries, boats, planes and even drones. Flores told us:
It's a misconception that everyone who makes a lot of money in drugs or other illegal business makes an effort to launder their money. My brother and I held much of what we earned in cash. We knew the government could eventually take everything [else].
The twins were right: in time, that's exactly what the US government did .
'Everyday' money laundering
In our study of money laundering strategies used by people involved in the illicit drug trade in the UK and US, we found that street dealers do not typically undertake sophisticated laundering processes. Rather, they spend their cash on food and other routine living expenses. One independent UK drug dealer, whose experience was typical of many, used the money earned from his cocaine sales to buy groceries and pay bills for himself and his daughter.
Spending money, even small amounts, gained through illegal activities is a money laundering offence - albeit one that is seldom prosecuted. As a result, these everyday activities that return illicit drug money to the legal economy are not well accounted for - even though the street value of drugs drives global market value estimates.
Business-savvy street dealers can earn gross revenues that approach the earnings of high-paid white-collar workers. But they must disguise their earnings' origins before they can spend them, of course, and various tactics are used to do this.
Some dealers solicit close friends or family members to act as "strawmen" . These are people willing to put assets paid for by illicit drug money - such as cars, properties or even businesses - in their names on behalf of the dealer. Idris Elba's character Stringer Bell in HBO's The Wire was an accurate portrayal of someone investing in legal enterprises using illicit drug money.
These strategies occur wherever illegal enterprise exists, and have done for well over a century. In the US, we interviewed wholesalers who had used family members to own houses and other properties on their behalf. This is done to mitigate against the risk of asset forfeiture should they be convicted of a crime. If an illicit enterprise can create a plausible beneficial owner who is not involved in crime, then the asset is harder to seize. This is why the Donald Trump administration's recent suspension of beneficial owner oversight is problematic from a drug enforcement perspective.
In liberal democracies, governments cannot investigate someone's finances simply because they are related to criminals. The dirty money that is put into their accounts can also be disguised as legitimate income making it difficult to identify, although thorough investigations may uncover it.
In the UK, we also talked to successful drug retailers who had set up local businesses in their own names. The EU's law enforcement agency, Europol, has reported similar activities throughout Europe.
Legal businesses are a common - and often hard-to-detect - vehicle to launder drug money. Bars, clubs, gyms, and hair, nail and tanning salons can be readily set up with drug money, as large cash infusions to establish a business are often not well scrutinised. These businesses are comparatively easy to run with significant cash flows, providing suitable cover for dirty money.
For example, a beauty salon, especially one that offers high-value boutique services, could easily incorporate drug revenue into its financial accounts by reporting sales that do not occur. Tanning salons can be set up with little expense since they require only sunbeds and the rental of a property.
Along with bars, clubs and salons, construction companies and restaurants stand out as other cash-intensive businesses with high volumes of transactions - characteristics that make good fronts for laundering money.
It's hard to spot a 'dirty' business
There is no surefire way to tell whether a business is a laundering front. While some may look like enterprises struggling to stay afloat, others develop into viable operations that eventually no longer need dirty money to sustain them.
Some drug dealers incorporate laundering practices within their legitimate jobs. Tradespeople such as electricians or plumbers, for example, can launder money by generating invoices for fake jobs, then reporting the income on their tax returns.
In both the UK and US, tax authorities are not charged with evaluating the veracity of the funds reported, and are generally satisfied once tax is paid. In other words, they generally trust declared income as proof of legal business activity. Moreover, they, along with the police, lack the resources to investigate these businesses for money laundering.
Through their legal businesses, many drug dealers pay significant taxes on their illegal revenue, and thus contribute to the economy.
Paying income tax effectively renders this income laundered. It can be invested and used to set up other businesses, or to purchase cars and properties without suspicion. It can also bolster credit ratings, and improve access to legal financial services such as bank loans.
Many small-time drug dealers start legal businesses in order to exit the illicit drug trade . We interviewed one cocaine dealer who had used his drug money to set up a retail electronics store; once it was successful, he stopped dealing. Similarly, the person behind a semi-legitimate nitrous oxide enterprise used his proceeds to set up a legitimate alcohol delivery service.
Through self-laundering, these modest drug dealers transform their proceeds of crime into spendable cash - and may eventually leave criminality behind altogether.
The (losing) battle against laundered money
Across the world, anti-money laundering efforts against organised criminal gangs are notoriously ineffective .
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - an intergovernmental organisation formed in 1999 to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism - assesses financial regulators' anti-money laundering controls all over the world. Countries designated as a risk that require monitoring are placed on the task force's "grey list" , while severe, high-risk countries go on its "black list" . Being put on these lists can result in a withdrawal of international investment and implementation of sanctions by other countries.
Although developing countries have often scored badly in their assessments, there has been some progress. While Kenya remained on the grey list in 2024, for example, it was found to have strengthened its measures to tackle both money laundering and terrorist financing. In the same year, though, Lebanon was added to the grey list over concerns on both counts.
The FATF's evaluation processes are designed to provide an objective assessment of whether a country has implemented its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing recommendations . However, the success of the FATF's anti-money laundering controls remains unclear .
Often lost in the criminal financing narrative is the role of bulk cash transfers. Even in a world that is moving to cashless transactions, cash generally remains the primary currency of both the illicit drug trade and corruption .
The biggest and most successful drug traffickers have significant cash reserves which are used to pay workers, replace drugs that are lost or seized, accrue assets, and bribe key officials .
Reflecting on his former illicit enterprise, Margarito Flores observed: "For every kilo of cocaine or heroin or methamphetamine we sold in the US, at least a kilo of cash went back to Mexico." For deals in Europe, Flores said: "Given the markup the further away you trade, the amount of cash sent back could be even higher - I would estimate it to be a kilo and a half."
Flores described the ineptitude of law enforcement in policing cash that was leaving the US:
No matter how careful we were, my brother and I lost a handful of loads of drugs heading north [from Mexico into the US]. Heading south was different: we just had the money put on tractor trailers and had it driven it across the border. We never lost a dollar. That's where politicians don't pay enough attention. That cash lets traffickers keep doing business.
Focus on the money as well as the drugs
So long as demand for illicit drugs exists, the industry will continue - and the revenue it generates will be laundered.
We believe that to curb the drugs trade, enforcement strategies need to go beyond simply capturing drugs and focus much more on capturing the money. Governments should go after reserves held not only by drug cartels but high-level distributors, such as those who replaced the Flores twins, and also wholesalers. People like these - comparatively high earners in destination countries - are the backbone of the illicit drugs trade.
Transnational law enforcement should prioritise detecting and seizing bulk cash transfers. These high-volume proceeds underwrite the wellbeing of drug trafficking organisations. Digital tools, such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, can be developed to create new techniques to track and trace suspicious transactions, although they alone won't solve all laundering problems.
Corruption of officials also remains a problem. Governments need to ensure their officials are well paid and sufficiently monitored in their roles - be they working in government, border control, banks, police departments or prisons. Unfortunately, the US has shirked its leadership in global anti-corruption efforts with the recent halting of the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , which bans the bribing of foreign officials.
Anti-money laundering efforts need to be consistently supported and required. Lamentably, the US has undermined its anti-money laundering toolkit by suspending the enforcement of beneficial ownership information reporting requirements . Establishing beneficial ownership helps financial institutions to identify parties that are hiding their financial interests, which can be an indication of money laundering or other criminal activity.
Similarly, foreign investment in producer countries can strengthen their capacity to counter laundering by supporting intelligence infrastructure and improved training. Recent cuts to USAid and the reduction of US State Department efforts in these areas is another indication that the US will no longer lead in these domains.
As cash businesses provide an easy mechanism for cleaning money, moving to a cashless society that uses digital transactions may help ensure that money is traceable. At the same time, cryptomarkets provide a minor, but potentially increasing, pathway to hiding dirty money digitally.
Ultimately, we should recognise the decades-long "war on drugs" for what it is: a policy costing trillions of dollars that combined mass incarceration with insufficient public health investment, and which has harmed the very communities the illicit drug trade affects the most. It is a difficult balance, but the pathway forward needs to reorient the objectives regarding drugs: invest in people, then go after the money that keeps the cartels, distributors and wholesalers afloat.
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Mark Berry received funding from the Dawes Trust for a prestigious PhD scholarship to undertake work that informs the contents of this article.
R.V. Gundur received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council to undertake work that informs the contents of this article. He is also a professional member of the International Compliance Association. The authors wish to thank Margarito Flores Jr (kingpintoeducator.com) for his help with this article.
