During the Super Bowl, every decision matters. With millions of fans watching, the game often comes down to a single play call. And no call is more scrutinized than what a coach decides to do on fourth down. Punt? Attempt a field goal? Or go for it?
A new BYU study explains why NFL coaches, including Super Bowl contenders Andy Reid (Kansas City Chiefs) and Nick Sirianni (Philadelphia Eagles), may behave too conservatively on fourth down. Despite growing acceptance of analytics-driven decision-making, most coaches, including these two, are more cautious than the numbers suggest they should be.
The study, recently published in the Annals of Applied Statistics , was conducted by BYU statistics professor Nate Sandholtz. He used an inverse optimization approach to assess the risk tolerance of NFL coaches based on their fourth-down decisions. Instead of trying to determine what coaches should do on fourth-down, this approach flipped the script. Researchers assumed that the coaches' actual decisions are the optimal answers—but that the problem the coaches were trying to solve is unknown. Sandholtz and his co-authors constructed a decision-making problem that, when solved, replicates what the coaches did.
By doing so, researchers learned about the hidden risk preferences that drove the coaches' behavior. The findings indicate that coaches tend to make riskier fourth-down decisions when the ball is in opponent territory, but they still fall short of what win probability models recommend.
Sandholtz also ranked each NFL coach on how risky their fourth down calls usually are. According to the research, Sirianni demonstrated a higher risk tolerance than Reid. Out of the 85 NFL coaches analyzed, Sirianni was the sixth riskiest. So, in Sunday's game, football fans can probably expect him to go for it on fourth down. Reid, on the other hand, tends to be more conservative and falls in the middle of the pack when it comes to taking risks on fourth downs.
The research reveals that while coaches have become more aggressive over time, they're still more conservative than win probability estimates suggest. This means that some coaches are likely leaving points on the field.
Of course, coaches don't make decisions like statistical models do. While a statistical model might spit out a 'perfect' fourth down call that is optimized for win probability, an NFL coach on the sideline of an intense game has a lot more to consider.
"Coaches think about factors beyond just the win or loss of a game," Sandholtz said. "Reputation, personal experience, and their perception in the eyes of owners, managers and fans all factor into their coaching decisions. Our model accounts for these factors through coach-specific risk parameters."
NFL coaches are not risk-neutral in their decision-making, which explains the discrepancy between analysts' prescriptions and coaches' behavior.
The study also highlights how risk tolerance varies depending on field position. Coaches tend to be more conservative on their own side of the 50 but show more willingness to go for it as they get closer to scoring territory.
So, what does this mean ahead of Super Bowl LIX on Sunday? Sandholtz says given Reid's and Sirianni's track records, fans can expect both coaches to take calculated risks. In a game that could be decided by a single possession, the decision to keep the offense on the field or send out the special teams unit might just be the difference between hoisting the Lombardi Trophy or going home empty-handed.
Reid's connection to BYU makes his fourth-down philosophy particularly relevant to Cougar fans. A former BYU offensive lineman and graduate assistant coach, Reid has carried his strategic mindset from Provo to NFL sidelines. Known for his innovative offensive schemes, Reid leads the Chiefs in the pursuit of a Super Bowl three-peat.
"In general, NFL coaches are trending towards the optimal behavior that we estimate in statistical models." Sandholtz said. "It'll be interesting to see if the risk tolerances we estimated for Reid and Sirianni play out in Sunday's game."
