Chair,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States thank Director General Grossi for his report on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement.
We commend the DG and the Secretariat for their continued professional, independent and impartial efforts to verify Iran's implementation of its safeguards obligations, including the Agency's repeated efforts to engage Iran to clarify information regarding the "correctness and completeness" of its declarations under its NPT-related Safeguards Agreement. Unfortunately, due to Iran's failure over several years to address the outstanding issues, the Agency continues to report that it is unable to assure that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
Chair,
Yet again we have in front of us a report from the Director General that demonstrates there has been no progress. Iran has not provided technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA's questions regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at Turquzabad and Varamin. Iran's continued stonewalling runs contrary to its legal obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the commitments it made to cooperate with the Agency under the Joint Statement of March 2023.
We also find ourselves once more discussing Iran's continued refusal to apply modified Code 3.1 as part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This is a legal obligation that Iran cannot unilaterally suspend or modify. As the Director General reminds us, report after report, Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities that is not implementing modified Code 3.1. This refusal prevents the Agency from obtaining early design information for new nuclear facilities necessary to prepare its safeguards approach. This should not be taken lightly. Given Iran's history of undeclared nuclear facilities, past and current unresolved questions, and several public statements made by current and former Iranian officials concerning Iran's technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Iran's actions further fuel serious doubts over whether Iran's nuclear activities remain exclusively peaceful.
Chair,
The report also highlights a number of other concerning issues, including the Agency's determination that the amount of uranium contained in the solid waste sent from Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) to the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for dissolution was less than had been declared by Iran in 2003-2004. We also note with concern that in August 2024, the Agency informed Iran that, with respect to uranium metal experiments conducted at JHL from 1995-2000, the amount of nuclear material the Agency found to be unaccounted for was greater than the amount the Agency had previously communicated. We commend the Agency for their diligent efforts so far and support the Agency continuing to investigate the discrepancy. In this regard, we urge Iran to fully co-operate with the Agency to clarify this matter.
We condemn the fact that Iran has confirmed it will not reverse its decision to de-designate several of the IAEA's most experienced inspectors, despite repeated requests by the DG and the international community since last September. As the DG previously reported, Iran's decision effectively made the Agency's independent technical work subject to political interpretation, and seriously affects the Agency's ability to effectively conduct its verification activities in Iran. Iran's unjustified decision clearly runs counter to the positive engagement with the Agency that Iran claims to want. We hope that Iran will reverse this decision in line with the spirit of collaboration agreed to in the March 2023 Joint Statement.
Let us make clear once again: Iran must implement its safeguards obligations in full and without further delay. As long as such cases of concern exist, there remains reasonable doubt about the nature of Iran's nuclear activities. The longstanding nature of these cases is also at risk of harming the broader global non-proliferation architecture, and risks setting dangerous precedents regarding the fulfilment of safeguards obligations.
Chair,
The E3 and the United States commend the DG's long-standing efforts to remain open to constructive engagement with Iran. Yet instead of seizing opportunities to engage constructively to resolve all outstanding questions, Iran has failed to offer any immediate concrete actions.
For five years now, the Board of Governors has been asking Iran to engage in good faith to resolve the safeguards investigations. Indeed, the Board has passed four resolutions on this matter since 2020, most recently in June 2024.
We would like to recall specifically that in June the Board reaffirmed its decision in its November 2022 resolution that it is essential and urgent that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and reiterated its call on Iran to:
- Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran
- Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,
- Provide all information, documentation and answers the Agency requires for that purpose,
- Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency.
Since June, we have again seen no progress from Iran or any real indication of a change in its longstanding pattern of delay with which this Board is familiar. Instead, Iran has doubled down on its decision to remove Agency inspectors, has made no progress on the outstanding safeguards issues, has continued to withhold required design information, and has so far ignored requests from the Agency to service cameras all while further expanding uranium enrichment activities that go well beyond any legitimate civil needs.
This Board has shown considerable patience. But that patience has its limits, and we will not stand by while Iran continues to obfuscate. If Iran continues to fail to provide the necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, further action by this Board will be necessary. This could include, in the coming months, a request to the DG to compile a Comprehensive Report. This report would provide a clear and updated assessment of all relevant information, allowing consideration of whether further steps would be needed, including making a finding under Article 19 of Iran's CSA.
Iran could render this action unnecessary if, as we have long called for, it chooses to urgently, fully and unambiguously co-operate with the Agency. Our efforts aim to resolutely support the Agency to this end - for the sake of the integrity of the international non-proliferation architecture and ultimately, global security. We cannot allow Iran to evade its NPT-related safeguards obligations year after year.
Chair,
We once again thank the DG for his commitment and express our unwavering support to the Agency for its impartial and professional work on this issue. We encourage the DG to continue to report to the Board in a timely manner and ask for the report contained in GOV/2024/44 to be derestricted and made public.
Thank you, Chair
