Thank you, Mister Chair.
On Monday 22 July, ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) released their fifth interim report on reported violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law in Ukraine.
The findings were disturbing but sadly not a surprise; they are consistent with findings by other international organisations. They are also consistent with the serious concerns that we and colleagues have repeatedly raised in this room.
For example, the report noted an intensification of attacks by Russian Federation forces since December 2023, resulting in increased civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including critical energy infrastructure. It notes a continued disregard for the principles of distinction and proportionality. We have heard similar points in this Council almost every week.
The report covered patterns of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances of civilians in the territories Russia temporarily controls and "widespread and systematic torture, including sexual torture against civilian detainees."
It cites evidence of the widespread use of torture and poor conditions of detention for prisoners of wars.
There was also further information in ODIHR's report on Russia's intensified efforts "to alter the status and character of the occupied territories in violation of IHL".
Mister Chair, there are many more examples. The point is that ODIHR's interim report is the latest contribution to the growing body of evidence detailing how Russia has executed this illegal war. It is right that the OSCE and its autonomous institutions should play a role in documenting these crimes and holding Russia to account. It is also right that we - participating States - continue to use this meeting to confront Russia with the uncomfortable truth and highlight violations of OSCE principles which we all agreed to honour.
In this spirit, on 6 June I asked the Russian delegation whether they considered Russia's actions in Ukraine to be in conformity with this first Helsinki principle and if so, whether they could explain how? Their response was to give an example - from 25 years ago - where they believed that others had failed to comply with the principle. That did not answer my question. So I ask again - does the Russian Federation stand by its commitment to the first Helsinki principle on sovereignty?
On 11 July, we asked how Russia's preconditions for negotiations with Ukraine conformed to several principles from the Decalogue. We did not get a direct response to this either. The speech by the Russian President called for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four oblasts that fall within Ukraine's internationally recognised borders. So could Russia confirm that they still stand by their commitments in Article 3 which prohibit the demand for and seizure of part of the territory of another state? Could we also get a proper answer on how the invasion of Ukraine complies with Article 4 which prohibits making the territory of a fellow state an object of military occupation? Does Russia still stand by that commitment? And finally, could we also get a direct answer to whether Russia still abides by its Article 2 commitments on the non-use of force in the light of the invasion?
Mister Chair, we should all be deeply concerned at how seriously Russia treats its commitments when those commitments become inconvenient. If they are allowed to discard OSCE principles and the UN Charter on this occasion, how could any of us have faith that they would comply with their commitments, here or elsewhere, in the future? I think those of us who share the Helsinki commitments and a common geographic home deserve straight answers. Because these principles were designed to keep us secure and if we compromise on them, we undermine all of our collective security. Thank you.
