Chair,
The United Kingdom thanks the Director General both for his comprehensive report on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine and for the recent report entitled: 'Two years of IAEA continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant'. We are, as ever, grateful to the IAEA personnel working to help maintain nuclear safety, security and safeguards across Ukraine under the most challenging of circumstances. We also value the IAEA as the only reliable, impartial provider of information to the International Community on what is actually happening at ZNPP.
Chair
As the DG has said, the situation at ZNPP continues to be precarious. The report before us today identifies a numerous specific concerns, all consequences of Russia's seizure, occupation and militarisation of a previously well run Ukrainian nuclear power plant. I would like to highlight three areas of particular concern:
First - that two years on, the ISAMZ mission cannot secure the access it requires to fully assess whether the DG's 5 Concrete Principles for Protecting the ZNPP are being observed at all times. Russian armed troops have blocked access to the western parts of the turbine halls. What are they hiding? The ISAMZ team has also been prevented from accessing the cooling pond isolation gate and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) switchyard. At the same time, this report confirms the presence onsite of armed troops and military equipment including armoured personnel carriers and weapons mounted armed vehicles;
Second - that, two years on, the IAEA continues to identify major shortcomings in existing emergency arrangements, specifically the ability to ensure an effective response in the event of any emergency that warrants implementation of public protective actions off site. To be clear this is about protecting people and the environment in the event of an emergency.
Third - Water and Power - that the IAEA report describes the diminishing availability of water at ZNPP and the vulnerable state of the off-site power supply to the Plant. Two years on, ZNPP continues to rely on only two off-site powerlines. Only last week one of those lines (the 330 kilovolt back up line) was disconnected for nearly three days.
Chair
Across Ukraine's NPPs, reliability of power supply remains concerning. On 26 August one reactor at Rivne NPP and one at South Ukraine NPP went into automatic shutdown, with reductions in operating power reported in the remaining reactor units at those plants, as a result of electrical grid fluctuations. On 26 August, Ukraine was enduring a massive Russian missile and drone attack, which targeted critical energy infrastructure. We welcome the DG's 3rd September update emphasising the importance of protecting Ukraine's energy infrastructure to ensure it does not impact nuclear safety and announcing planned IAEA assessments of damaged Ukrainian substations.
Despite these extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine's Nuclear Power Plants remaining under Ukrainian control, continue to operate safely and effectively, carrying out scheduled maintenance, with reliable supply chains, and conducting large scale emergency exercises. We are aware of the toll this takes on the operating staff, hence our support for trauma risk management workshops in July aimed at equipping NPP managers, supervisors and psychologists with the skills to spot signs of distress and provide support.
Chair,
Mindful of the time, I apologise for adding a couple of additional points to the statement that I had planned to make but I must address some of the Russian propaganda that we have heard this evening:
First, drone attacks. The UK has made clear, including at the UN Security Council, our support for the DG's 5 Principles for protecting the ZNPP - principles that have been necessary because of Russia's seizure and occupation of a Ukrainian nuclear power plant. We do not condone any drone attacks at, towards, or from ZNPP. In relation to alleged drone attacks - reports coming from Russian personnel exercising control over the Plant - we appreciate, and rely on, the fact based, impartial reporting of the IAEA - our only source of reliable information.
Second, this Board must be clear that the situation at Kursk NPP and ZNPP are not comparable. Unlike Russia we have not witnessed Ukraine intentionally seize and endanger a NPP on another country's sovereign territory. And we all heard our distinguished Ukrainian colleague make a clear statement to the Board this week that Ukraine has no intention of targeting a NPP.
With that, I take note of report GOV/2024/45 and ask that it be made public.
Thank you, Chair.
