The new Dutch government aims to put farmers' craftsmanship back at the centre of achieving legal targets for ammonia emission, greenhouse gases, and groundwater quality. Farmers are free to decide how they meet these goals, while the government will limit its role to 'target-based' governance. Wageningen researchers Wim de Vries, Gerard Ros, Roel Jongeneel, and Martin van Ittersum have further developed this concept in a new booklet.
- Which forms of target-based governance are the most effective for achieving the goals?
- How can farm-specific targets for emissions of ammonia and greenhouse gases, and for the nitrogen surplus be derived from national legal objectives?
- What is the role of calculation tools and measurements in establishing critical performance indicators (KPIs) for these targets?
- Can measures to reduce emissions be reliably enforced at the farm level, and is the system legally feasible?
The research collective identifies four types of target-based governance.
Incentive-based governance
Farmers voluntarily choose to pursue an environmental or nature-related goal and receive financial compensation for their efforts. An example is the agri-environmental and landscape management scheme, where farmers are rewarded for protecting meadow birds or maintaining hedgerows and ponds.
Performance-based governance
This type focuses on rewarding farmers based on measurable results. For example, the Farm Soil and Water Plan allows farmers to earn points by implementing measures that improve soil health and water quality.
Norm-based governance
In this approach, the government translates targets into mandatory standards that farmers must meet. Failure to comply results in penalties. Past examples include the Mineral Accounting System (MINAS), aimed at reducing nutrient losses around 2000.
Pricing-based governance
This combines setting standards with market mechanisms. Farmers are allocated emission ceilings for ammonia and greenhouse gases in the form of emission rights. These rights can be traded, bought, or leased, creating a market value for emissions while allowing the market to regulate emission reductions.
Phased implementation
To meet legal targets for nitrogen, water quality, and climate, the research collective suggests norm-based governance as the primary method. However, for enhancing on-farm biodiversity, incentive-based and performance-based governance are more suitable. Norm-based governance would play a role in permitting and enforcement, requiring precise calculations and legal certainty.
However, the researchers recommend a phased approach, starting with incentive-based governance in the early stages and gradually transitioning to norm-based governance with deadlines for achieving targets. This allows for a smoother implementation and better acceptance among farmers while addressing practical and legal challenges towards a transition to norm-based governance.
Emission thresholds
The publication proposes methods for translating national objectives for the year 2035 (ammonia) and 2050 (greenhouse gases) into farm-specific targets. Policymakers, in interaction with the agricultural sector, can decide on the best approach. Regardless of the method, the government needs to set clear thresholds for emission of ammonia and greenhouse gases, and for nitrogen surpluses in view of nitrate leaching. The land-based farming sectors will have emission thresholds per hectare, while the intensive livestock sectors will have thresholds per animal.
The researchers calculated thresholds per hectare for the land-based farming sectors and thresholds per animal for the intensive (landless) livestock sectors, including four methods for allocating the national target for ammonia emissions to those thresholds. In the first allocation method, all farmers in the Netherlands must collectively halve their ammonia emissions. This results in a threshold of 22 kilograms of ammonia emissions per hectare per year for land-based farms and e.g. 0.51 kilograms of ammonia emissions per pig per year. In the second scenario, the intensive livestock sector must reduce its current ammonia emissions by 75%, while land-based farms must achieve a 40% reduction. This creates different thresholds for each sector. Alternative allocation methods are proposed in a third and fourth scenario.
Emission Rights and Monitoring emissions
Based on these calculations, the government can allocate emission rights to farms, which would gradually decrease to meet the 2035 and 2050 targets. This provides farmers with long-term clarity about their obligations. To ensure compliance, the nitrogen surplus and the emissions of ammonia and greenhouse gases need to be estimated to assess whether farmers remain within permitted emission levels. The emissions can be estimated using a combination of calculations and data from on-site measurements.
Trials are currently underway with sensors that accurately measure ammonia and methane emissions from different types of livestock housing. While these sensors can refine calculation models, they cannot yet measure emissions from grazing or manure spreading.
Since extensive on-site measurements at every farm would be costly, the researchers propose a mixed approach. Relatively simple measurements, such as urea content in milk and Total Ammoniacal Nitrogen (TAN) contents in manure, combined with sensor data from selected farms, could offer sufficient insights into emissions. This approach would reduce the need for strict monitoring of individual measures, as the measurements reveal the result of measures.
Legal framework
The researchers suggest including ammonia, nitrate, and greenhouse gas thresholds in future environmental permits at farm level, based on the land area or animal numbers. By legally defining the calculation methods and standards, enforcement could focus on verifying compliance with these legally prescribed norms. The researchers advise the government to make clear decisions on the instruments and phasing of target-based governance.
